



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ist eine naive Selbsttäuschung, denn erneutes Unglück wird ihn in den Zustand, aus dem er sich durch Reue und Beichte erhoben hat, zurückwerfen.

Such expressions as "kindliche Selbstempfehlungen," "flache Glückseligkeitslehre," "die energielose, pharisäische Ethik der völligen Absonderung von den ἀμάρτωλοι," abound. It is a curious inversion of the parable for the exponent of true repentance to thank God so often and so roundly that he is not as this Pharisee! To an understanding, either of the Psalms themselves or of the Jewish notions of sin and grace, this slight study contributes little.

Ottley's *Religion of Israel*⁶ is intended to supplement his *Short History of the Hebrews* (1901). It is a readable outline of the history from a modern point of view, chiefly at second-hand. It seems to be meant for readers who want to get up some information on the subject in a few evenings' easy reading; to say that it will answer that purpose is perhaps to give it as much praise as it asks.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Cambridge, Mass.

SOME IMPORTANT BOOKS ON THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

"The science of religion is a new discipline which has arisen and developed as an independent branch of learning only in recent decades, and is still partly in a state of embryo, struggling for the acknowledgment of its right"—such were the opening words of the second edition of Chantepie de la Saussaye's well-known manual, which may be considered as the standard work of the history of religions. It is interesting to see how the new edition¹ which has lately appeared begins: "The science of religion has in the recent decades acquired and maintained its place in the range of sciences." The difference is striking. Indeed, in the seven years which have elapsed since the former edition was published, the science of religion has decidedly advanced, and there can be no doubt whatever on what its progress is founded. "The science of religion"—I quote again from Chantepie de la Saussaye—"has as its object the investigation of religion, of its character and its manifestations. Therefore it naturally

⁶ *The Religion of Israel: A Historical Sketch*. By R. L. Ottley. Cambridge: University Press, 1905. xii + 227 pages. 4s.

¹ *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*. Von P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye. 2 Bände. Dritte vollständig neu bearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 543 + 587 pages. M. 24.

divides itself into the philosophy of religion and the history of religion" (Vol. I, p. 4). It is the *historical* part which, in incomparably greater degree, has enlisted, nay almost absorbed, the interests of learned scholars in these last few years. A fast-increasing scientific literature, which is operating with the acuteness of philological method, and taking as its basis the facts which anthropology and ethnology, especially folklore, furnish it, witnesses to the truth of the acknowledgment by philologists also "that the different branches of the science of history and the single philologies which search into the culture of single nations or single groups of nations cannot derive a just and profound knowledge of the forms of religious thought merely from the sources which in their special provinces are accessible to them, and that the single 'mythologies' must halt or go astray wherever the analogies which are to be gained elsewhere are not called to aid."² It is its empirical state which has caused the science of religion to gain the credit which it today enjoys; not its speculative treatment, which, based on so abundant material, still remains the postulate of a distant future.

Of course, Chantepie de la Saussaye's new edition has made use of the progress of detailed empirical investigation; in this consists its main superiority over the second edition. This improvement is noticeable at first sight, even in the external form; instead of 399+512 pages of the former volumes, there are now 543+587; i. e., over 200 pages more. The increase in bulk is due to additional information, especially concerning the religions of the Chinese (58 pages instead of 28), Japanese (57 instead of 10), Semites (138 instead of 81), Greeks (170 instead of 141), Romans 127 instead of 108), and Germans (40 instead of 30). It is not, of course, to be understood that the others have not also been retouched, in particular those on the religions of the uncivilized tribes (40 instead of 32). Here, however, even with this enlargement, I cannot but feel that we have comparatively much too brief a treatment, especially since I am convinced that in the religions of primitive peoples we best get acquainted with certain popular "undercurrents" which are still flowing at the base of higher religions. We are beginning to note the great distinction which is to be made between the official religion of the priests and theologians, and popular religion. The more this distinction is emphasized—I do not think that up to the present this has been done to a sufficient extent—the more we shall find that with an approximatively equal state of culture popular religion always and everywhere remains remarkably unchanged, and is easily to be reduced to quite a small number of elements, while the official

² Albrecht Dieterich, *Vorwort zum Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, Vol. VII (1904), p. 1. Cf. A. E. I. Holwerda in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 237 ff.

religion of priests shows an abundance of typical, more or less differentiated varieties, which grow up in the course of time. In the case of language it was observed long ago that the common people work with an amazingly limited vocabulary, while even the average man makes use of a manifold stock of words. Should we not expect something analogous in religion? Much more stress ought to be laid, I think, on its dependence upon the prevailing state of civilization, not only, as is generally granted, of a people as a whole, but of its different classes; for so little is civilization something absolute, that there always will remain in the midst of the higher stage which at any given time has been attained, some survivals of lower stages, which in a process of gradual assimilation have to be raised to its own level. This is the very reason why the study of primitive religions, which can give us the best key to the understanding of those popular "undercurrents," is of so great importance. A more exhaustive treatment of these religions would allow the author to abbreviate some expositions which perhaps the reader will get weary of finding repeated, although in many variations, in the description of any religion among the civilized races, while such repetitions cannot but weaken the impression of some differences which are characteristic of these higher religions.

But, of course, this idea can be perfectly realized only in the work of an author who at the beginning of a new chapter has not before him, as Chantepie de la Saussaye's collaborators had, only blank pages—and with this I have pointed to the weak side of the book. We miss a certain unity of conception which makes any work, as it were, a work of art. We have in it as many histories of religion as there are religions—one might even suggest that it would be desirable in a new edition for the different parts to be also sold separately—while the ideal would be *one* continuous history. The want of unity is all the more apparent in the present edition, Chantepie de la Saussaye having increased the number of collaborators, while keeping for his own subject only the religion of the Germans (the treatment of which is partly based on the author's large work on the subject), of the Celts, and of the Slavs.

On the other hand, what constitutes the weakness of the book creates in reality its superiority. As it is prepared exclusively by specialists, it has the great advantage of presenting a treatment of the matter which is throughout quite up to date and not at all *dilettante*. In this it is exempt at once from one of the objections, which Professor Harnack in a much-criticised lecture,³ has raised against the study of the history of religions in general.

³ *Die Aufgabe der theologischen Facultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*. Reviewed in *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. VII (1903), p. 332.

It is impossible to give here even a sketch of the rich contents of the work. We can only bring into prominence some points where the present edition excels the last one. In the religions of savage peoples, in the treatment of which Thomas Achelis has lent his assistance, more attention is paid to primitive myths, with reference to L. Frobenius' works. Due stress is laid on the interesting phenomenon of secret associations.⁴ The fact is emphasized that, without prejudice to the worship of spirits, the idea of a mighty deity, which is considered as having created the world or as governing it, is widespread. There is especially to be noticed the new conception of animism, not in Edward B. Tylor's sense of the belief in individually formed souls, but in an impersonal vital power, a fluid of life—*tanoana*, as the Bareë tribes of Celebes call it. It may be, I suggest, somewhat like the Orenda of the Iroquois, which I. N. B. Hewitt has described in the *American Anthropologist*.⁵ In the same sense Professor Söderblom, in his valuable booklet on the religions of the earth,⁶ speaks of life-electricity, a soul-material which has the faculty of evaporating or condensing and incorporating itself in different shapes.

In the treatment of Chinese religions, which at the hand of so eminent a connoisseur as De Groot has been given quite a new form, one will be struck at finding Confucianism and Taoism so closely connected as to be quite intermingled. Wu and Hih—i. e., the Taoistic priests—are dealt with under the head of Confucianism, while Yih-King and Tschung-yung figure under that of Taoism. "Properly there cannot be any question of a special Taoistic religion beside the Confucian," says De Groot (Vol. I, p. 104). Quite new, too, is Professor R. Lange's treatment of Japanese religions, whose worship as well in Buddhism as in Shintoism (which itself is "nothing but a mixture of nature- and ancestor-worship") he sketches very clearly, with plenty of interesting detail. For the treatment of Semitic religions in anterior Asia, especially Assyria and Babylonia, Friedrich Jeremias has fully availed himself of the latest results which are due to recent excavations (for Canaan in particular to Sellin's discoveries in Ta'anek). He has given us quite a new piece of work. His manner of treating the matter is governed by the view, to which he positively adheres, of a developed astral system as basis of the divine worship in Assyria and Babylonia, and to a certain, I think by him rather exaggerated, degree even in Canaan. Yet this astral system appears to be combined with a "nature-religion based on the change of the seasons, which goes back to

⁴ Cf. especially H. Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin, 1902).

⁵ 1902, pp. 33-46.

⁶ *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, Series III, No. 3, p. 8.

the earliest times and which determines the features of the West-Semitic religions" (Vol. I, p. 271). Jeremias is certainly right in clearly distinguishing the monarchical speculations of Babylonian priests from real monotheism (pp. 278 f.). One question of detail deserves notice. Jeremias thinks Rešeph to have been an Egyptian god (pp. 350, 375), while, on the contrary, H. O. Lange, who treats of the Egyptian religion, considers him as Semitic (Vol. I, p. 212). In the chapter on the Roman religion, for the better understanding of which we are especially indebted to Wissowa, we are glad to meet with a fuller treatment of the cult of Mithra, based, of course, on Fr. Cumont's praiseworthy researches. Professor A. E. I. Holwerda, who has retouched this part, has wholly recast that on the Greek religion: its central idea—increasing anthropomorphism, deification of the human—is clearly brought into evidence by him. "The attempt was made to raise that which could give to earthly life a noble and worthy endowment to the range of religion. By degrees it sunk back into its own sphere, in which it retained its eternal value" (Vol. II, p. 403).

I regret that the book has not a fuller index, the present one without proper names being quite insufficient. Finally, special thanks must be addressed to Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye, who with this edition takes leave of his manual, to which we owe so much for having promoted the knowledge of the history of religions. We are glad to know that its future will be secured by intrusting its further redaction to so competent a scholar as Dr. Lehmann, to whom we already are indebted for the entire treatment of the Indian and Persian and partial treatment of primitive religions.

A useful, concise treatment of the history of religions is given us by J. A. Macculloch.⁷ The principal value of his booklet rests in the first part which, after discussing the origin of the religious idea in man, is devoted to an account of certain dominant religious beliefs and practices among savage races. Yet more stress ought to have been laid on sidereal and stone-worship. Its second half, religion among the higher races, is, in parts, decidedly too short; e. g., in Mohammedanism no mention is made of the "five ground-pillars." Here he has too exclusively emphasized the despotic and cruel side of the Mohammedan's god. He is not a loving god, it is true, but the Qurân does not tire of repeating God's compassionateness. The Egyptians ought no longer to be quoted as classic representatives of the belief in metempsychosis (p. 77). In the statement of the Homeric conception of the future state, the author fails to show any

⁷ *Religion, Its Origin and Forms*. By J. A. Macculloch. ["The Temple Primers."] London: Dent, 1904. 185 pages.

acquaintance with Rohde's *Psyche* (p. 137). I do not wish to argue with him about the origin of religion (cf. p. 112).

It is with only a limited part of the history of religions that Professor D. S. Margoliouth is dealing in his *Religions of Bible Lands*.⁸ He considers as Bible lands "chiefly the lands either comprised in or adjacent to Canaan;" i. e., Phoenicia, Philistia, Syria, Moab, Egypt, Persia. Why not Assyria and Babylonia? "The title 'Bible Lands'," he says, "seems scarcely appropriate to a country in which the greater part of the Israelitish race disappeared from history, and which the restored community abandoned, taking with them no feeling but abhorrence" (p. 4). I do not think this apology to be very persuasive.

Margoliouth's treatment of the Semitic religions is a valuable piece of work. Yet some allegations are to be received with caution. Thus, e. g., Margoliouth declares the name of the Philistines to be Semitic (p. 2). It may be observed that the most recent research concerning its origin arrives at the opposite conclusion.⁹ Is it quite so certain that in Bethlehem there is the name of the god Lahmu (p. 12), that Tyrus is the name of the god Sur which "is familiar in the Old Testament" (p. 18), that Dagan is Sumerian (p. 20), that Rimmon is Rahman "loving" (*loc. cit.*)? And here I may add the author's keen conjecture that Eshmun is perhaps equal to the eight gods of the Egyptian ennead thought of as one god (p. 82). As to his supposition that probably the temples came to serve as treasuries or banks (p. 33), we possess evidence that such has really been the case; cf. Judges 9:4; 1 Kings 15:18; 2 Kings 18:15.

Concerning the religion of Persia I should object to the statement that "the after-world, though recognized, does not enter seriously into the calculation of the Mazdeist" (p. 125). On the contrary, he seems to have been very earnestly interested in his future state, and, as we know, it is still an open question how far, if at all, the Jewish eschatology has been influenced by the Mazdayan. Nor do I think it correct to state that "the Ameshaspends in origin were abstractions is clear from their names" (p. 112). Louis H. Gray¹⁰ may be right in having lately tried to trace the evolution of the Zoroastrian archangels from nature-godlings to spiritual abstractions. Finally, there are two errata: on p. 30 for Micah we ought to read Amos, and on p. 63 Exod. 8:26 is impossible.

⁸ *Religions of Bible Lands*. By D. Margoliouth. New York: Armstrong; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. 132 pages.

⁹ A. Noordtjiz, *De Filistijnen, hun Afkomst en Geschiedenis* (Kampen: Kok, 1905), p. 17.

¹⁰ "The Double Nature of the Iranian Archangels," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, Vol. VII (1904), pp. 345-72.

A special problem of the history of religions is treated by Lanessan.¹¹ In what relation do religion and morals stand to each other? Lanessan deals with the morals in the Jewish, Indian, Greek, Roman, and Christian religions, not in religion in general, as his title would lead one to suppose. He furnishes us with a certain amount of materials gathered, partly from the sources themselves (evidently in translations; that the author does not know, e. g., Hebrew is clearly shown by the twice occurring *selanim* on p. 3), partly at second hand. His book consists to a large extent merely of quotations which, as they fill pages and pages, now and then render perusal rather tiresome. Lanessan's own originality in the book is of a very doubtful value: he tries to show that, on the whole, religion did nothing but arrest the natural progress of moral development by superimposing on natural morality an artificial one, as it also arrested the progress of science among the Semites by substituting purely imaginative or metaphysical speculations for scientific observations, so as to transform astronomy into astrology (pp. 236 f.). Thus religion was only an "obstacle" to moral evolution (p. 363), since it added to the ideas born from the relations between men and men, those which are engendered by the interests of the priestly class (p. 238), these two moralities being as much opposed to each other as day and night, as truth and error, as right and wrong (p. 409). Against priestly interest—here, of course, India opens to him a vast field (p. 224)—he becomes greatly aroused, and he scarcely seems to recognize any other origin of the religion (pp. 39, 177, 231, 546). Nor does he do justice to Christianity. In spite of the fact that Islam has not any priestly class (pp. 525, 549)—by the by, Lanessan confounds the *mufti* with the *muezzin* (pp. 490, 525)—still he ought not to have extolled the Mohammedan "*zakat*" above Christian charity (p. 520), nor have reproached Christianity with not having raised the condition of women and children (p. 435). Why does he take as the only basis of Christian ethics the explanation of the Mosaic law given by the *Catechismus Romanus* (pp. 366 ff.), instead of the New Testament? But Lanessan seems none too well versed in biblical matters; else he would not speak of the cry of the Christian (*sic!*) orator: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" (p. 568)! But why should he be interested in the Bible? A book whose narratives are "childish, ridiculous, or brutal" (p. 483) is certainly a negligible quantity, even for one who writes on a religious problem. Yet so warm a defender of "human" morality ought not to be mistaken about the author of the well-known, "*homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto*," which is Terence, not

¹¹ *La morale des religions*. Par J. L. de Lanessan. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 568 pages. Fr. 10.

Seneca, as he states (p. 361)! By the way, against the alleged non-heredity of the Egyptian priests (p. 2, n. 1) he may compare Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*,¹² p. 56.

Of course, the problem of morals and religion is a very perplexing one, but it is not to be solved by prejudice or by *a priori* conceptions, but only by a careful historical investigation; and this path one ought not to tread without a sober historical sense. That originally religion and morality flow from different sources I do not doubt; and there is no lack of historical examples to show that religion can come into conflict with morality and arrest its progress. No Christian of today will, I hope, defend the Inquisition or the crusade against the Albigenses, upon which Lanessan lays stress (p. 412). On the other hand, where religion is acknowledged to have played, on the whole, an important part in promoting morals, the difficulty will be rightly to value the extent to which it is involved in the moral utterances. This is not easy to determine even in the case of Stoics such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. How much more so with Plato, whom, with Socrates, Lanessan would like to regard as the founder of scientific morality as opposed to religious (p. 274). As a matter of fact, one should not overlook the imposing testimony of so many men, who have been convinced that the real force of their moral life has rested in their religion, and that their best achievements during their life have originated in religious impulses. Here we may compare the fine pages which Professor Dorner devotes to this subject in his philosophy of religion,¹³ where he tries to show how the consciousness that all things are summed up in God, that man is one with him who proves to be absolute activity and reason, cannot fail to increase our own energy and reason.

With Dorner's book we enter the province of the philosophy of religion. "The history of religion cannot do without it," remarks Chantepie de la Saussaye (Vol. I, pp. 4 f.), "because not only the disposition and judgment of religious phenomena, but even the assertion that a phenomenon is of a religious character, depends upon some previous comprehension of the nature of religion." How shall we discover this nature? It is impossible to give any detailed answer to this question within so narrow a compass. How very complex the question is, may be seen from the suggestive essay of Professor Tröltzsch, which gives a very clear survey of the philosophy of religion at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁴

¹² *Handbücher der königlichen Museen in Berlin* (Berlin: Reimer, 1905).

¹³ *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*. Von A. Dorner. Leipzig: Dürr, 1903. xviii+448 pages. M. 7.

¹⁴ "Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," *Festschrift für Kuno Fischer*, I (Heidelberg: Winter, 1904), pp. 104-62.

"It is," says he, "a sheaf of different problems and methods, very difficult to reduce to a uniform treatment" (*loc. cit.*, p. 108). By distinguishing the empirical from the speculative method, as is generally done, nothing more than the main direction which the investigation can take is pointed out; for as, *in praxi*, we shall find an infinite number of more or less imperceptible compromises, the whole set of possibilities can be only imperfectly included under these two headings. Yet they prove to be the best catch-words, if we look for any; and as for Dorner, there cannot be any doubt that he is even a rather uncompromising representative of the speculative party which is not just now in the majority. "There are," as he says, "at the present time many men who wish to search into religion only psychologically and historically, and to obtain from the material thus gained some general formulæ. . . . Whether the object of religion, the deity, does exist or not, is here hardly to be decided, as experience does not tell us anything about it" (p. 4). To this Dorner opposes his own view, the starting-point of which is "that at the heart of religion there is an overempirical reality; that its character is not to be known by the way of empiricism; that religion in its development tends toward an ideal; that, therefore, the main object is to comprehend this overempirical reality as well as the ideal of religion itself; and that this is possible only by means of speculation" (p. 4).

To these speculative longings Dorner gives free scope in his metaphysics, where, as I should be inclined to say, he carries a rather naïve mythology right into the midst of the divine consciousness itself! In order to explain the manifoldness of the world, he thinks it necessary to suppose in God himself some primordial differences, i. e., different manners of being—a real one, which is God's will, and an ideal one, which is his reason—which by the divine activity are bound eternally together into an indissoluble unity. As such, God knows himself to be the ground of the possibility of all reality; he surveys the possibilities of new forms of existence into which the potentialities united in him can separate, and rejoices at their springing into existence. May I add that apparently there could be only one perfect combination of potentialities? Why, then, does God suffer his perfection to beget a less perfect combination than himself? And if, as Dorner states, the world-potentialities have in a new way to be brought again into unity, the end of the whole process, if ever it tends to perfection, will be a mere reduplication of the absolute being, the use of which nobody can tell! The question how God is to be thought of is preceded by the demonstration that according to reason the idea of his real existence is a necessary one. Dorner goes even farther: There must be realities, since

we are obliged to think in categories of reality. In this form the ontological proof is the basis of his whole argumentation.

While in the second part metaphysics is supposed to guarantee religion as being founded in God as the religious object, the third part deals with the psychological conditions of the religious subject, i. e., with human belief and its expressions. Here, as throughout the book, one will notice that most stress is laid on the intellectual side. It is the intellectual trend for unity which, according to Dorner, causes mankind to conceive the idea of God, and the certainty of belief increases with the development of consciousness, which in its highest form raises the idea of God to scientific certainty. Or again: "At last the religion of the spirit will rise to a free knowledge which does not recoil from historical and speculative criticism, and which distinguishes between the religious principle and the peculiar form in which it has been historically realized at a certain time" (p. 259). "Not the historical, but the metaphysical brings blessedness"—this opinion of Fichte is shared by Dorner. He thinks that historical facts are nothing but a stimulus for believing. By the "religious principle" he means the idea of God-manhood. Such is the conclusion of the first part of the book where the phenomenology of religion is dealt with. The development of religion keeps pace with the development of the human intellect; at its height, in Christianity (which he esteems to be a higher combination of the Aryan and the Semitic spirit), immanence and transcendence of the Deity are united, and the immediate communion of God and man is realized. Dorner tries to trace historically the absolute religious ideal; and once more it proves to be God-manhood.

In the last part some laws of the religious life are deduced: first, the teleological law which presides over the development of religion, the religious consciousness materially progressing toward the absolute ideal of religion, while formally it advances toward monotheism and tends to become a continuous fundamental feeling. This law conflicts with the psychological one of persistence, the balancing of both leading to that of gradual transitions.

The pleasure of reading Dorner's *Grundriss* is diminished by the fact that it is not at all a *Grundriss*; the author's prolixity would be a serious reproach even to an exhaustive handbook. In fact, we miss a well-planned structure in the book. Yet there is much to be learned from this work, and it contains some remarkable pages; e. g., where Dorner describes the *ego* as being by virtue of its relation to God the most concentrated power of the world (pp. 403-6). As he thinks that where the religious ideal is realized there is no more need of a specific practice of religion, the necessity

of a public cult is called in question, and from the cult, as it still exists, he wishes to banish the religious art which, as he states, remains only symbolical. It thus distracts attention from a realization of the communion with God which the cult ought to bring (p. 398). This I consider to be the erroneous consequence of Dorner's overrating the intellectual side of religion. In observing how much preference he gives to the "word" as the most spiritual expression of spiritual things, I cannot help feeling that we have an intellectual "survival," as it were, of that old word-superstition, the fascinating history of which, complex as it is, ought some day to be written. May I here contrast Morris Jastrow's¹⁵ words: "In our days, when all conditions favor the suppression of the emotions, emphasis should be laid upon the value of allowing our emotions freer play. . . . Applying this principle to the religious cult, it is eminently proper for our emotions to be aroused by soul-stirring chants, by the resonant peals of an organ."

Quite different from Dorner's somewhat old-style work is Tiele's *Outlines*,¹⁶—a philosophy, or rather, as he prefers to call it, a science of religion in a new style. The method which he follows can be designated as the purely historical, inasmuch as it starts from what is established by historical research. "The science of religion, however," says he, "has to give equal consideration to the results of anthropology, psychology, sociology, and especially comparative religions" (p. 2). What has become of Dorner's metaphysical fancies? We find in Tiele's booklet no metaphysics whatever: "Not the superhuman itself, but only what results from belief in this superhuman, is the object" of his treatise; it deals only with man as a religious being. So he briefly leads us through the whole process of religious development from the lowest nature-religions to the highest ethical ones. His pregnant and concise characterizations of religions at once betray the hand of the connoisseur. We are shown, not only various grades, but different trends of development within the different religious groups, as well as within any single group. Here we meet with Tiele's well-known distinction between theanthropic (= Aryan) and theocratic (= Semitic) religions. But are not certain laws to be deduced from this whole development? At this very point a philosophical manner of viewing the matter is seen. Tiele affirms that there are laws of development of the human spirit in general in relation to religion, and he enumer-

¹⁵ *The Study of Religion* (London: Scott, 1901), p. 282.

¹⁶ *Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft*. Von C. P. Tiele. Autorisierte deutsche Bearbeitung von G. Gehrlich. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 70 pages. M. 1.80.

ates some of these. But are there not more? In particular I miss the above-cited law of psychological persistence, which explains a good deal of religious conservatism. Moreover, it is easy to observe in the history of religion certain tendencies which, without strictly assuming the character of laws, are not far from having the same value. So we universally find the progressing deification of extraordinary religious men—that is the truth in the Euhemeristic theory—while under certain circumstances a continuous process of degradation of divine beings takes place. Further, there is a regular tendency to materialize piety, which, as Dörner has well pointed out, characterizes almost all religions (p. 301).

Religion being in a process of continuous development, Tiele calls the part dealing with its history the morphological, as contrasted with the ontological, which fills the second half of his booklet. That is to say, as a center of religious development there is something common to all religions which is constant and permanent, whatever shape it may assume. To discover this permanent element Tiele analyzes religious phenomena—i. e., (1) religious ideas, (2) religious deeds, (3) religious association—and by a synthesis he tries to determine the character of religion. It is, he concludes, religious feeling which we best call piety or religiousness, something which is most like the feeling we have toward men who are above us and with whom we are intimately united (pp. 61, 63). Its essence is the adoration of the Highest. (p. 64) As to the origin of religion, Tiele states that unconsciously man carries the idea of the infinite within himself, that he is created to aspire to it, and that this constitutes his very character as man. With this idea is associated the innate impulse to causality. Historically religion is born, he thinks, from some kind of reaction of the religious feeling against dissatisfaction with all worldly insufficiency and limitation (p. 67). Here, it seems to me, is the greatest lack in Tiele's system; for, as the history of religion clearly teaches us, every new religion, at any rate, takes its rise from a concrete human experience of some manifestation which is always considered as being of superhuman origin. Are we not permitted, nay even forced, to imagine religion's first beginnings likewise in this way?

Tiele's outlines will not fail to induce many readers to take up his Gifford Lectures on *The Elements of the Science of Religion*, which of course afford the best commentary on the present work.

Finally a few words may be said on a booklet which has a practical aim.¹⁷ What conclusions are to be drawn for missions from the character

¹⁷ *Das Heidentum als religiöses Problem in missionswissenschaftlichen Umrissen.* Von Georg Stosch. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. 155 pages.

and present state of non-Christian religions as viewed from the standpoint of Christianity? (Let me immediately add: Christianity, as the author understands it.) The premises from which he starts is that Christianity is the only "revealed" religion. From this premise there results for him an unfavorable critical judgment of the "pagan" religions: they are religions of gradual defection from a primordial revelation, the vestiges of which he tries to trace from the history of religion. In spite of these relics of revelation, the essence of paganism is in direct contradiction to that which forms the essence of true religion. Therefore it is the object of missions to mediate to paganism the divine revelation (p. 129). Stosch's book is, I dare say, an esoteric one for "believers" in the narrowest sense of the word, while for readers who do not share his dogmatic presuppositions it is interesting merely as showing how difficult it is for circles standing under the constraint of an unalterable dogma to remain in touch with the progressing work of science. One can scarcely enter upon scientific discussion with an author who adheres to the principle that psychological truth in the perfect sense requires the assertion of historical reality (p. 45); who still decides the question of priority concerning the book of Enoch and the epistle of Jude by asserting the derived character of the pseudepigraph (p. 49, n. 3); who thinks that the agreement of biblical and Babylonian accounts is not to be explained by any literary dependence or priority, but by primeval influences (pp. 37 f.). But there is worse yet. I need only quote the few following sentences: "The Hindu lives in mere illusions, and he *knows* that he lives in imaginations. But he considers it to be normal. The Sivait is not Sivait in the sense of holding Siva as a reality," etc. (p. 142). It would be better, I think, not to reproach the modern science of religion with a desire to avoid the categories of "true" and "false." Personally, one may have the unswerving conviction, even scientifically founded, that Christianity is the true religion, and yet be more just and modest in his judgment. Who knows? Perhaps it will be the very best fruit of our studies of comparative religion to render us more just and modest.

ALFRED BERTHOLET.

UNIVERSITY OF BASLE.

This¹⁸ is a really alluring attempt to rationalize the Mosaic tradition on the basis of our most imperfect knowledge of the old Arabian religion. It is true, on the one hand, that all revelational value vanishes from the story as completely as in the reconstructions which admit no wilderness

¹⁸ *Die altarabische Mondreligion und die mosaische Ueberlieferung.* Von Ditlef Nielsen. Mit 42 Abbildungen. Strassburg: Trübner, 1904. 224 pages. M. 5.

or Egyptian period at all, and, on the other hand, that Dr. Nielsen carefully guards himself from deciding, in the meantime, whether the story is a true echo of events or merely a demoniacally clever reconstruction by the Hebrews from their idea of their early history and their knowledge of Arabian theology. But there cannot be much question to which view Dr. Nielsen inclines. The other presupposes among the Hebrews a great imaginative artist with a collection of materials for local color like those of our modern historical novelists—say Homer developing the *Odyssey* on the method of Mr. Winston Churchill. Yet, if—and it is a large “if”—this reconstruction of Arabian religion is sound, the Mosaic reconstruction, in turn, has much to say for itself. Much better than even Budde’s hypothesis does it put before us living figures, a possible environment, and a self-developing action.

The book divides itself into two parts. First, an exposition of Arabian religion as a lunar religion—the author will not permit us to say lunar worship; the personal, ethical God of the oldest stratum of Semitic names is connected in figure with the moon in its varying phases, but the personality and qualities remain. Further, Arabia, with its nomad night-journeys, chooses the moon, while the peasant life and interests of Babylonia choose the sun. Next, a sacred moon leads to sacred phases with corresponding ritual seasons. So a lunar reckoning of time develops in Arabia and a solar in Babylonia. We have the origin of the week, and then the problem of combining weeks into solar years. This Dr. Nielsen hunts with pertinacity and skill through all the old Semitic calendars. But to it all there is the great handicap that the south Arabian inscriptions have not yet yielded any calendar information. Sacred times and seasons being thus provisionally settled, places and symbols are taken up. For these there is much more evidence, and especially important is a hitherto unpublished description by Glaser of the temple at Marib.

In the second part the agreement is worked out of all that has been thus developed with the Mosaic story. It is certainly most suggestively close. The idea, in a word, is that it was to an Arabian sanctuary that the children of Israel were brought; that the theophany on the mount consisted in the rites of that sanctuary, as seen by the ignorant and fearful people; and that they were then sent on their way, equipped by a regular authority with a tribal god and a body of laws and ritual—admitted, as it were, to the fellowship of the Arabian people. The hypothesis, as I have said, is most alluring, if we could only be sure of the basis. The materials are too scanty, and, until Glaser’s hoards are published, not much increase can be looked for. Those which Dr. Nielsen draws from Muslim sources

are somewhat risky. A connection may possibly lie between the *istihtal* cry, at new moon, and the exceptional use of the same word, in a tradition, for the cry of the infant when Satan touches him at birth; another, curiously confused, between the new moon and the phrase "between the horns of Satan," where the sun is said to rise and set, at which times prayer is forbidden. For this last, see Goldziher's *Arabische Philologie*, Vol. I, pp. 113 ff.; others could undoubtedly be gathered from the traditions.

DUNCAN B. MACDONALD.

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

M. Decharme, well known for his excellent volume on Greek mythology, proposes in the present book¹⁹ to treat historically the attitude of Greek thinkers toward the myths of gods and heroes. Some of the myths, when judged by human standards, are grossly immoral; in many of them the miraculous element is the center of interest; all the myths deal with supernatural beings. From Hesiod on, the poets and historians and philosophers are studied in the effort to trace the development of the tendency first to modify myth, then to criticise it, to reject it, and finally to explain it. That the author occasionally stops to develop the positive conceptions of the god put forward by philosophy (pp. 47, 56, 211) is readily pardoned, even though it sometimes introduces lack of symmetry into the discussion. The section on Plato's eschatology (pp. 191-208), for example, has but little to do with the main theme. On the other hand, few readers will feel either that Lucian should be omitted from the discussion, or that Homer sings "with full belief in the reality of the legends of the past." On the contrary, the light tone in which the epic often handles the gods as actors in its drama may well be regarded as the original source to which the current of sceptical thought may be traced back.

The standpoint from which myths are criticised is predominantly either religious, or moral, or philosophical. For Hesiod, the Ionic philosophers, and the early historians, the inconsistency of the myths and their contradictions of experience are the motives which lead to their modification. The chapter on the theogonies perhaps lays undue stress on the foreign elements introduced, and on the philosophical interest of those who composed them; still, it is true that in the theogony attributed to Hesiod myths are freely modified to fit into a definite system. Herodotus' naïve criticism, and the strict historical sense of Thucydides in handling the myths, are admirably described. In Xenophanes, and in less degree in Theognis,

¹⁹ *La critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque*. Par Paul Decharme. Paris: Picard, 1904. xiv+508 pages. Fr. 7.50.

we find the earliest religious criticism of myths; in Pindar and Æschylus moral and religious standards combined to cause the rejection of some myths and the modification of others. The freedom with which religious men like Pindar, Æschylus, and Sophocles handle the content of myth should have led M. Decharme to define his theme more carefully. Sometimes Æschylus is as ready as the "atheists" to reject the myths of Zeus in his effort to reach a higher conception of God. The freedom with which our author turns from the criticism of religious belief to the criticism of myth, and the reverse, often leads to confusion in the argument. In reality the criticism of myth and the history of impiety, the double theme outlined in the preface, are two themes which, however closely they are related, should be kept distinct in the discussion. That poetry and history and philosophy should have been permitted to handle myth so freely is due to the fact that no real inconsistency between their procedure and popular religion developed before the middle of the fifth century B. C.

It was, however, inevitable that the criticism of myth and the rise of natural science should come into conflict with established religion. The explanation of religion as a device to frighten men away from crimes, the rejection of stories of the gods by historians and philosophers and poets, the substitution of natural causes for divinities in the attempt to reach a scientific account of the world, all contributed to bring on this crisis. The chapter on lawsuits for impiety treats this theme in an interesting but rather summary fashion. For example, an account of the suits against Anaxagoras and against Phidias is not at all so simple a matter as the reader of this chapter would imagine.

Both the breakdown of popular religion, and the recognition that philosophy attacked popular theology rather than the worship of the people, tended to make this crisis less acute after 400 B. C. "L'athéisme finit par être toléré." The philosophers as a rule were not atheists, but men who in their systems substituted another kind of gods for the divinities of the people. Even when the popular gods were explained as natural forces and the myths as allegories of nature, even when these gods were regarded as men of old distinguished for their great power or beneficent deeds, the discussions of the philosophers had little or no influence to break down the institutions of worship.

The two longest sections of the book, perhaps the sections of greatest interest to the general reader, deal with the Stoics and with Plutarch. In both the author goes outside his theme in that he deals not simply with the criticism of myth and religious belief, but more particularly with the inter-

pretation of popular religion by these thinkers. Of the two chapters on the Stoics, the first outlines the theology of the school in connection with its physics, and the second discusses in detail the interpretation of each god in the Stoic system. The book would have been more symmetrical in its argument if the second of these chapters had been omitted, for in a section added to the first chapter the different principles which had been used for the interpretation of myth are examined—principles which the Stoic applied without any considerable change. It is interesting to note that these principles are still in vogue. The physical interpretation of Greek myths, begun by Theogenes in his study of Homer, and continued by Metrodorus of Lampsacus and the Stoics, finds its exponents now in a physical school of myth-critics, of which W. H. Roscher is the most eminent living representative. The interpretation of myths as moral fables has continued from the time of Antisthenes to comparatively recent days. Thirdly, the study of the gods through their names is a method not invented by modern students of linguistics; it began in the Homeric hymns and flourished among the Stoics.

For a French critic, who would not need to blush at the comparison, it would be an interesting task to examine the treatment of somewhat this same topic in an attractive volume recently published in Boston.²⁰ It is a bad omen for a book to begin with a sentence in which a singular verb follows a plural subject ("love of life and aspirations . . . constitute . . . and is")—no doubt a printer's error, even though this is not the only instance of its occurrence. The style of the book is awkward, often heavy. In spite of his wide reading and judicious quotations, the author often succeeds in missing the point in his discussions. The section entitled "Greek Religion" contains one or two striking thoughts, though the argument in general proceeds along wrong lines. The account of Greek philosophy fails entirely to trace the significance of the movement that ended with Socrates, and concludes lamely with a bare suggestion that "the philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle," who are omitted from the discussion.

Still, the book has this value, that it is written by a man who seems to have come under the influence of the high moral standards of Stoicism. Apparently he feels their force and, however awkwardly, is seeking to pass on their message to his readers. The selections from Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius are well chosen. The author does not state whether they are his own translation or not, and the omission of references makes

²⁰ *Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of its Disciples*. By Charles H. Stanley Davis. Boston: Turner. viii + 269 pages. \$1.40.

it difficult to compare them with the original. The passages which I have taken the time to hunt up are rendered with reasonable accuracy, though not always in pleasing English.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY

Professor Santayana's first two volumes¹ in his proposed series of five will arouse wide interest. The remaining volumes² are entitled *Reason in Religion*, *Reason in Art*, *Reason in Science*. As the titles indicate, the author aims at presenting a broad-minded constructive synthesis of the main results reached through the free investigation of the nature and implications of human experience. Science, Art, Ethics, Religion are, in turn, called upon to contribute data. These data (as the title, "Reason," indicates) are woven together into a consistent fabric, in whose variegated pattern may be traced a unity of design and treatment. Professor Santayana's problem is to spell out clearly for the individual mind its own characteristics and meaning, as these have been determined by the larger processes of humanity, of whose activities the individual mind is but the passing embodiment. His method is that of observing and analyzing life in its objective forms, taking as his instructors all those who in times past have labored upon the same problems, but correcting and supplementing each by his own observations and keen analyses. His field, therefore, is as broad as human life, measured to the confines of barbarism, on the one hand, and of the highest forms of civilization, on the other. With sympathetic but clear-minded insight he endeavors to interpret life through itself. His motive is to be found in the desire to formulate an intelligent ideal of conduct—for to Professor Santayana the life of reason is as truly practical as reflective. Its conquests are never made in the interest of barren abstractions but always as the means of formulating the conditions of more fruitful and noble forms of living. Such a task, intelligently confronted, might well seem impossible of achievement in any but the most crass and superficial manner. Of this, Professor Santayana is fully conscious. His is not the mood of the blind enthusiast, nor that of the shallow dilettante. He is entirely serious and keenly cautious. There

¹ *The Life of Reason*. By George Santayana. Vols. I and II: *Reason in Common Sense*; *Reason in Society*. New York: Scribner. ix+291 and viii+205 pages. \$1.25 each.

² Vols. III and IV have already been issued; Vol. V is still in preparation.